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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
H. J. CORNELL and AMBROSE
BLACK, d/b/a Country Club
Foods, a Partnership,
Petitioners and Appellants.

Case No.

vs.

9272

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the interest of clarity, the Tax Commission
will herein take the liberty of amplifying the statement of facts set out by taxpayer.
In the course of the audit referred to by petitioner, the Tax Commission examined sales tickets,
sales journals, stamps on hand, any oleomargarine on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hand and purchase records in the possession of Country Club Foods and allowed credit for any inventories,
stamp purchases and exempt sales. The balance was
set up as taxable. The Tax Commission also found
it necessary to examine the sales records of Ray and
Whitney Brokerage Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, brokers for Best Foods products as the purchase records of
Country Club Foods for the period of August 31,
19 56 to December of that year were not available for
inspection, and the oleomargarine purchased by Country Club Foods for that period of time was purchased
from said brokerage company. The Tax Commission
did not find as a fact that the assessment in question
was completely based upon the sales records of a third
party, nor did it find as fact that the tax was not assessed upon the presence of any oleomargarine packages or containers in petitioner's possession or place
of business.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE
TAX COMMISSION
1. Section 59-18-4, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, imposed a tax upon the sale of oleomargarine
in the state of Utah at the rate of 5c per pound if not
artificially colored and 1Oc per pound if artificially
colored.
2. Under Section 59-18-5, Utah Code Annotateed, 19 53, it was provided that certain oleomarga-
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rine taxes were to be paid by affixing stamps previously purchased from the Tax Commission, within
72 hours after the oleomargarine is received by any
wholesaler, retailer or distributor within this state,
provided, however, that any such oleomargarine had
to be stamped before it was sold within this state.
3. That under the same statute, the presence of
any package or container in the place of business of any
person required by the povisions of this chapter to
stamp the same would be prima facie evidence that
they were intended for sale and subject to tax under
this chapter.
4. Section 59-18-14, Utah Code Annotated,
19 53, gave the U tab State Tax Commission the
power and duty to enter upon the premises of any
taxpayer and to examine or cause to be examined by
any agent or representative designated for that purpose
any books, papers and memoranda bearing upon the
taxes payable and to secure any other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement of
this chapter.
5. That the statutes hereinabove referred to are
wholly applicable to the issues in controversy.
6. That the petitioner was required by the provisions of the aforementioned statutes to stamp oleomargarine in its possession.
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7. That through investigation by the Tax
Commission, it was discovered that certain oleomargarine in the possession of petitioner had not been so
stamped. The petitioner failed to show that such oleomargarine was not intended for sale and thus not subject to tax under the aforementioned statutes.
8. That the petitioner is liable to the State Tax
Commission under the laws of the state of Utah for
the tax deficiency itemized in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the findings of fact hereinabove set forth.
HISTORY OF
OLEOMARGARINE LEGISLATION
Oleomargarine is a food product commonly
used as a butter substitute and is made from animal
and vegetable oils or from vegetable oils alone. The
elements which make up this product are essentially
the same as those in butter; modern authorities, however, rcognize that there is often a difference in vitamin
content. In its natural state oleomargarine generally
has a white color. In view of a public preference for a
yellow color and also in some cases actual! y to deceive
the public, it has been common practice to color oleomargarine yellow artificial! y. It is also common to
add artificial coloring to butter to enhance its yellow
color during those seasons when butter is naturally
pale (Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 18:79-96, Fe. '46).
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5
Oleomargarine first become part of American
commerce in the 1870's (33 Va. L. Rev. 631-41). In
the early days of the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine and other butter substitutes, many fraudulent schemes to increase sales were perpetrated on the
public, and for this reason there arose a real need for
public regulation. There was a prevalence of adulteration and deception of consumers by "palming off"
the product as butter. Manufacture often took place
under unsanitary conditions. The dairymen to protect
their products and the public to protect themselves began to petition their legislatures to pass laws necessary
to remove the chances of fraud. There was a real need
for government regulation. So closely did the substitutes presented to the public resemble actual butter
that the fraudulent sale of oleomargarine as butter
became easy and common. False or misleading advertising, especially misleading implications that oleomargarine was a dairy product, was common ( 10
Montana L. Rev. 46-63 Spring '49).
The state legislation in this field is of three types:
fiscal, prohibitory and regulatory, or combinations of
the three. U tab's act is fiscal in nature, and has had at
least up to the time of the passage of the statutes in
question herein, regulatory features. Statutes similar
in nature to Utah's are in effect in Idaho, Iowa, North
Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
The first Utah legislation dealing with oleomarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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garine was passed in 1929 (Chapter 91). That act
provided for a tax of 5c per pound on the sale of uncolored and 1Oc per pound on the sale of colored oleomargarine. It also required that a dealer in either product must purchase a license permit, and a fee of $5.00
was deposited in the general fund of the local government issuing the permit. Each separate purchase of
oleomargarine was to bear a stamp, prepared by the
State Auditor and issued by him to the State Treasurer on requisition. The Treasurer was responsible
for collection of the tax.
This act was amended by Chapter 6, Laws of
U tab, 19 3 0, to provide tba t the dealers' licenses were
to be issued to the State Treasurer, and that the fees
were to go to the general fund of the state.
In 19 3 3 the legislature, in the Second Special
Session, combined the oleomargarine statute (Chapter 6, Laws of Utah, 1930, Title 66, revised statutes
of 1933) and the tobacco statute (Chapter 5, Laws
of Utah, 1930, Chapter 1, Title 93, revised statutes
of 1933) into one chapter, Chapter 17. The revision
was probably motivated by the similarities in the two
laws. Both provided for licensing of dealers. Both
imposed an excise tax. Both effected collection of that
tax in the same manner: through the use of stamps;
and both provided penal ties for violations.
In 1947 (Chapter 138) 93-1-1 was amended
by deleting the provision requiring dealers' licenses for
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the sale of oleomargarine. The legislature, in 19 53,
placed combined oleomargarine and tobacco statutes
with Chapter 18 of Title 59, which is the present revenue and taxation title of the Code.
The Utah state legislature has also seen fit to pass
regulatory measures related to imitations of butter in
Title 4, Sections 27 and 28, U. C. A., 1953, under
the Dairy Section of the Code.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS SET
FORTH IN TITLE 59, CI-IAPTER 18,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS PRESUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL.
I.

II. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION
23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
III. NEITHER THE OLEOMARGARINE
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59,
CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE A N N 0 TATED, 1953, NOR THE ADMINISTRATION THEREOF BY THE STATE TAX
COMMISSION IN THIS CASE, VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF
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THE UNITED STATES OR UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTIONS.
IV. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACTt AS
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59 CHAPTER 18t
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24,
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW
UNIFORMLY SUPPORTS THE POSITION
TAKEN BY THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, AS SET FORTH IN THIS
BRIEF.
t

VI. LEGISLATIVE INTENT C A N B E
CLEARLY DISCERNED FROM THE PROV I S I 0 N S OF THE OLEOMARGARINE
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59t CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE ANNOT ATEDt
1953, AND THOSE PROVISIONS CAN BE
HARMONIZED SO AS TO GIVE EACH
ONE MEANING, AND SUPPORT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT.
VII. THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF TAXING STATUTES IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
ARGUMENT
THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS SET
FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18,
I.
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IS PRESUMPTIVELY CONSTITUTIONAL.
The taxpayers have attacked the constitutionality of the legislative act herein involved. In doing
so, they shoulder a difficult burden. Utah law is replete with cases announcing and reaffirming the doctrine that the court is reluctant to interfere with the
enactments of the legislature; that "All doubts should
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and no act should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly and palpably so." and that the court
must hold legislation constitutional if there is any reasonable basis to sustain it. Newcomb v. Ogden City
Public School Teachers, Retirement Comm., 121 Ut.
503, 243 P. 2d 941 (1952); State v. Packard, 122
Ut. 369,250 P. 2d 561 (1952); G. E. Co. v. Thrifty
Sales, Inc., 5 Ut. 2d 326, 301 P. 2d 741 (1956);
Denver and R. G. R. Co. v. Central W'eber Sewer Imp.
Dist., 4 Ut. 2d 105, 287 P. 2d 884 (1955); Thomas
v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Ut. 108, 197 P.
2d477 (1948).
If there are two alternatives to interpretation of
a statute, one of which would make it constitutionally
doubful and the other which would render it constitutional, the latter will prevail. State Water Pollution
Control Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Ut. 2d 247, 311
P. 2d 3 70 ( 19 57).
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II. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION
23, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Taxpayers assert that the Oleomargarine License
Act as set forth in Title 18, U tab Code Annotated,
19 53, is a violation of Article VI, Section 2 3 of the
Constitution of Utah, which states that:
''Except general appropriation bills, and
bills for the codification and general revision of
laws, no bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
It should be made clear that the title of an act
need not be an index to all that the act provides. State
v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075
( 19 59). The fact, then, that the title to this Act does
not completely list its contents is not fatal.
"All that is
matter of the Act
title * * *."
2d 314, 333 P. 2d

required is that the subject
be reasonably related to the
State v. Twitchell, 8 Ut.
1075 (1959).

The title of the Act in question informs the
reader that there are sections contained therein relating
to oleomargarine and tobacco. The placement of the
Act in the revenue and taxation title of the Code
makes it clear that a tax of some type is imposed on
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both products. It is true the title would lead one to
erroneous! y believe that licenses were required to deal
in both products, when a license is in fact required only
for dealers in tobacco. However, though this highlights legislative oversight, it does so in a manner not
fatal to the Act. The title and the act should be surveyed in the light of the purpose of the constitutional
provision, which is to guard against surreptitious or
in ad vert en t inclusion of rna tters in the legislation of
which the legislators and the public are not aware. A
liberal view should be taken both of the act and the
constitutional provision so as not to hamper the law
making power. Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Ut. 2d 67,
305 P. 2d 870 (1957). All doubts must be resolved
in favor of the law. Utah State Fair Ass'n, et al. v.
Green, et al., 68 Ut. 251, 249 P. 1016 (1926). In
this case, then the sin is of commission not omission, so
it does not violate the spirit and purpose of the act.
State v. Kallas, et al., 97 Ut. 492, 94 P. 2d 414
(1939). The title can be properly broader than the
act. Cooley Taxation 4th E. ( 1924), Vol. I, Section
. 499.
"The constitutional requirement that an
act contain but one subject clearly expressed in
the title is not a technical restriction on the legislature but is for the practical purpose of informing the legislature and the public of the
legislation proposed and a title which will lead
into inquiry in the body of the act * * *
is sufficient." Thomas V. Daughters of Utah
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Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P. 2d 477
(1948).
The title of an act is sufficient if it is not productive of surprise and fraud and calculated to mislead
the legislature or the people, but fairly apprises the legislators and public of the subject matter of the legislation and puts anyone having an interest therein on
inquiry. Martineau v. Crabbe, 46 Ut. 327, 150 P.
304 ( 1915).
It is true that the provisions contained under an
act should be germane. However, the fact that the
provisions differ in some respects does not render the
act unconstitutional. State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d
314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959).
Taxpayers admit on page 11 of their brief that
the imposition of excise taxes on the sale of oleomargarine and tobacco and the provisions deriving revenue therefrom are probably cognate. It is respectfully
contended by the Tax Commission that these provisions are indeed cognate and that in addition, the provisions for the use of stamps, the collection procedures,
and the provision giving the Tax Commission the job
of administering both the regulatory and taxing provision of the Act are also cognate. ( 59-18-14, Utah
Code Ann. 1953.) In fact, then, the Act imposes taxation and regulation on both products in a like manner. The deletion by the legislature of the licensing
requirements for oleomargarine dealers merely estab-
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lished one dissimilarity, but as aforementioned, the
fact that the provisions differ in some respects does not
render the Act unconstitutional. State v. Twitchell,
8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 1075 (1959). Nor need
the connection or relationship be logical. M artineaux
v. C·rabbe, 46 Utah 327, 150 P. 304 (1915) though
the Tax Commission contends that in this instance
the connection and relationship is logical.
The Carter v. State Tax Commission case which
taxpayers cite on page 11 of their brief to give support
to their attack is readily distinguishable in that the title
of that Act gave no hint of revenue provisions contained therein. The statute was under the Motor Vehicle Act, and the legislature did not in fact intend
that the statute should be a revenue act. The court,
however, held that in spite of legislative intent the
provision was in fact a revenue position. There was
no way the reader could be apprised of a tax contained
and imposed therein.
In the M artineaux case, it is stated that

"* * *

if * * * by any reasonable construction, the title of the act can be
made to conform to the constitutional requirements, it is the duty of the Courts to adopt this
construction rather than another, which will
defeat the act. * * * In case of doubt it
must be assumed that the legislature understood
and applied the title so as to comply with the
constitutional provision, and not contrary
thereto.''
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III. NEITHER THE OLEOMARGARINE
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59,
CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE A N N 0 TATED, 1953, NOR THE ADMINISTRATION THEREOF BY THE STATE TAX
COMMISSION IN THIS CASE, VIOLATES
THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OR UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTIONS.
Taxpayers contend in Point III of their brief that
the oleomargarine tax violates Amendment V and
Amendment XIV, Section I of the Constitution of the
United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah which provide that
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
They also allege in their argument that the procedure
which the Tax Commission followed in assessing the
tax and arriving at a determination that the assessment
was valid was violative of those same Due Process
prOVlSlOnS.
T'he Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is not applicable to state legislation. Brown
v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 819, 16 S. Ct.
644. It is a limitation upon the powers of Congress.
Ibid.
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plicable to state legislation, Ibid. and due process objections are generally treated the same for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the state clauses,
Untermyer v. State Tax Comm., 102 Ut. 214, 129
P. 2d 881 ( 1941). We will consider them jointly for
the purposes of this brief.
Due Process Clauses are applied as a limitation
upon the taxing power of the states only in rare and
special instances. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.
S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934); Garrett
Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm., 103 Utah 390,
135 P. 2d 523, 146 A. L. R. 1003 (1943). A particular tax law * * * will not be struck down
as a violation of due process unless the state's action
is palpably arbitrary or grossly unequal in its application to the persons concerned. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. ~ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109
( 1934) and see 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 91. In nearly every
case * * * except those cases where notice and
hearing are involved, the United States Supreme Court
has rejected such a contention without discussion.
Cooley, Taxation, 4 on E., ( 1924) Vol. I, Sec. 14 3.
Property taken in the lawful sense of the taxing
power is not taken without due process of law, regardless of the amount of that tax. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. Ed. 1109
( 1934). A tax does not violate the due process clause
because it operates unjustly, even to the extent of destroying a lawful business. Ibid .
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If the tax is for private instead of a public pur ..
pose, the due process clause is violated. This is also
true where a tax is upon part only of those belonging
to the same class. Cooley Taxation, 4th E., ( 1924),
Volume I, Section 14 3. Taxes can be for a public purpose although imposed other than for purposes of revenue, such as tariff duties for the encouragement of
manufacturers or license fees upon certain obligations
with a view to regulation. Cooley Taxation, 4th E.
( 1924), Volume I, Section 182. The determination
as to what is and what is not a public purpose belongs
in the first instance to the legislative department. State
ex rei. Douglas County v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74
N. W. 59, 39 L. R. A. 513, 38 Am. St. Rep. 629.
The presumption is that a tax is valid;-that the
motives of legislature were public;-that the legislature acted honestly and with fair purpose;-that it
moved with deliberate judgment. Cooley Taxation,
4th E. ( 1924), Volume I, Section 188. To justify
the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring
the tax void, the absence of all public interest in the
purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear
and palpable. Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624;
see Cooley, Taxation 4th E. ( 1924), Vol. I, Section
189. Taxes to upbuild or improve the agricultural resources of the state have been upheld as not being violative of due process. Cooley, Taxation, 4th E.
( 1924), Volume I, Sec. 205. Taxation in aid of private industry has been held proper if the industry to
be benefited should be one of such magnitude in that
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its property constitutes a substantial element of the
public welfare, or it should be of a character which
renders it important to the public. Cooley, Taxation,
4th E. ( 1924), Volume I, Section 205.
Administrative process of the customary sort is
as much due process of law as judicial process. Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 8 U. 245, 249, 30 P. 760, 16 L.
R. A. 689 ( 1892). In depriving a person of life or
liberty, or property, the essentials of due process are:
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or
agency authorized by law to determine the questions;
(b) an inquiry into the merits of the question by such
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the person of the
inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time
at which such person should appear if he wishes to be
heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel;
(e) fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and
cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be rendered
upon the record thus made. In the absence of statute
laying down other or more specific requirements, the
above conditions meet the demands of due process.
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314
(1945).
The Tax Commission has accepted the facts substantially as they were set out by taxpayers, but contends that the fact stipulated to by both parties, that
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sarily implies that the oleomargarine involved was, for
a time at least, in taxpayers' possession. The Tax
Commission found it necessary to examine the sales
records of a third party who dealt with the taxpayers, due to the incomplete nature of their records, and
taxpayers made no attempt to introduce facts that
would refute the finding of fact that the oleomargarine
was in fact received by them.

''*

* *

The presence of any package
or container in the place of business of any person required by the provisions of this chapter
to stamp the same shall be prima facie evidence
that they are intended for sale and subject to
tax under this chapter." 59-18-5, Utah Code
Annotated, 19 53.
There was, then, a prima facie case before the
Tax Commission that the oleomargarine in question
was intended for sale and subjct to tax under the oleomargarine tax statute. As a result, it is not necessary,
under our statute, to find that the taxpayers did in
fact sell the oleomargarine. It is not necessary to find
as fact that they possessed it longer than 72 hours.
Taxpayers must overturn the prima facie case before
the Tax Commission, and their flat, unsupported denial that the oleomargarine was not held for sale or
in their possession for less than 72 hours, was not sufficient to overturn that case.
The Tax Commission agents did not act improperly in making their assessment based on records of
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deliveries. That was a practical and reasonable mode
of audit.
As to the prima facie case set up by statute in 5918-5 (2), which the Tax Commission relied on, and
justifiably so, as the Tax Commission has no business
questioning the validity or constitutionality of legislative enactments. Shea v. State Tax Comm., 101
Utah 209, 120 P. 2d 274 (1941). Thus, that body
was duty bound to follow statutory mandates and
procedures.

'' * * *

it is com pet en t for a legislative body to provide by statute * * *
that certain facts shall be prima facie or pre-sumptive evidence of other facts, if there is a
natural relationship between the facts proved
and those presumed. Such clauses do not violate
federal or state due process requirements. ( 86
A. L. R. 180 and collected cases.) It is only invalid when the presumption is arbitrary, and
there is no rational connection, or the law operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it.''

Ibid.
This is but the enactment of a rule of evidence,
and it quite within the general power of the government; the law of evidence is full of presumptions,
either of fact or law. There must only be a connection
between them in reason or experience and a fair opportunity of rebuttal. State v. Parella, 40 U tab 56, 119
Pac. 1023 ( 1911); State v. Converse, 40 Utah 72,
119 Pac. 10 3 0 ( 19 \-L) .
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The taxpayers were properly audited and given
the opportunity of a hearing before the Utah State
Tax Commission. In that hearing they were given
full opportunity to present their version of the law
and the facts through counsel, and the Tax Commission properly followed the mandate of the statute under which it operates. Taxpayers were given procedural due process in all particulars.
IV. THE OLEOMARGARINE ACT, AS
SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DOES
NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, SECTION 24,
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Under Point II, taxpayers contend that the oleomargarine act as set forth in Title 59, Chapter 18,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a violation of Article
I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution, which states
that:
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.''
They point to the split-tax provisions of the Utah
law, which tax the sale of colored oleomargarine at a
higher rate than the sale of uncolored oleomargarine
and allege that such provisions are unjustly discriminatory and thus unconstitutional. They, then, in
the closing sentence of Point II, incidentally refer to
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the fact that colored oleomargarine is also classified
differently than butter and other foodstuffs.
Classifications in an enactment will not be held
invalid merely because they may create hypothetical
or theoretical discriminations, such discriminations
having no effect upon the actual parties to the litigation in which the valdity of the legislation is challenged. Roberts and S. Co. v. Emerson, 271 U. S.
50, 70 L. Ed. 827, 46 S. Ct. 375, 45 A. L. R. 1495;
see 51, Am. J ur., Sec. 181 and collected cases. There
is no showing by taxpayers that the split-tax provisions of the Utah Act are arbitrary and discriminatory
in their application to them. A person seeking to raise
the question of the validity of a discriminatory statute
has no standing for that purpose unless he belongs to
the class which is prejudiced by the statute and where
the class which includes the party complaining is in
no manner prejudiced, First Nat. Bank v. Louisiana
State Tax Commission, 289 U. S. 60, 77 L. Ed.
1030, 53 S. Ct. 511,87 A. L. R. 840; See 11 Am.
Jur. Sec. 114 and collected cases, it is immaterial
whether a law discriminates against other classes or
denies other persons equal protection of the law. See
11 Am. J ur. Sec. 113 and collected cases; M onamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 78 L. Ed. 1141,
54 S. Ct. 575. The court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is absolutely necessary in
deciding a case. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 76
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L. Ed. 598, 52 S. Ct. 285; see 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 93
and collected cases.
Taxpayers show no evidence of the tax having
a confiscatory or destructive effect on their business.
They only contend that the tax is higher than that
of other foodstuffs. It should be pointed out that
"their is no imperative requirement that taxes
shall be absolutely equal. This would stop the
operation of government." Cooley, Taxation,
4th E., (1924), Volume I, Section 259.
"Rates may be fixed differently for different classes, provided the classification is not
purely arbitrary." Com. v. Merchants' and
Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 168 Pa. St. 309, 31
Stl. 1065; Cooley, Taxation, 4th E., ( 1924),
Volume I, Section 292.
Uniformity requirements of a State Constitution
do not prohibit the making of classifications nor of
sub-classifications in state legslation relating to taxation, Feath~erstone v. Norman, 170 Ga. 3 70, 153 S.
E. 58, 70 A. L. R. 449; See 51 Am. Jur. 179 and
collected cases; and the state legislators have the right
to select the differences upon which such classifications
should be based. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525,
63 L. Ed. 1124, 40 S. Ct. 2; see 51 Am. Jur. Sec. 173
and collected cases. The power of the legislature to
classify is very broad in the field of taxation. It is
broader than in some other exercises of legislation in
that the grounds for classification for purposes of tax-
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ation need not be stated. Garrett Freight Lines v. State
Tax Comm., 103 Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523, 146 A.
L. R. 1003 ( 194 3). Such classifications may be justified even though the burdened activity may be in fact
discouraged. The court in the Alaska Fishing and
Salting and By-Products v. Smith (1921), 255 U.S.
44, 41 S. Ct. 219, 65 L. Ed. 489, case faced with a
tax which discriminated against a particular type of
fishing indus try stated that,
''Even if * * * [the] tax should
destroy a business, it would not be made invalid
* * * on that ground alone. Those who
enter u pan a business take that risk.''
It also stated that protective tariffs do not contravene
our constitution.
Quang Wing v. Kirkendall, 233 U. S. 59, 32 S.
Ct. 192, 56 L. Ed. 350, adopted the rationale of McCray v. U. S. in upholding a tax statute through
which a particular type of laundry business was destroyed. The justification may be on the basis of a
public policy which sees an advantage to the general
discouragement of others. Miles v. Dept. of Treasury,
welfare in the encouragement of one activity and the
209 Ind. 172, 199 N. E. 372, 97 A. L. R. 1474, 101
A. L. R. 1359, appeal dismissed in 298 U.S. 640, 80
L. Ed. 1372, 56 S. Ct. 750. The court said in Heiser
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83,
6 7 L. Ed. 2 3 7, that a statute which taxed anthracite
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coal and exempted bituminous coal was valid in that
discriminations are often necessary in government in
the best interests of society, as the purpose of the legislatur may be only to remove obstacles to a greater public welfare.
There is case law to the effect that the following
bases of classification, discrimination, and distinction
are valid and permissable:
(a) Ability to bear the burden of the tax. Gar•ret Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm., 103
Utah 390, 135 P. 2d 523, 146 A. L. R.
1003 (1943).
(b) The promotion of fair competitive condition.s. Great Atlantic and P. Tea Co. v.
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193,
57 S. Ct. 3, 112 A. L. R. 293.
(c) The equalization of economic advantage.
Ibid.
(d) The encouragement of particular industries
from a consideration of public policy. Miles
v. Dept. of Treasury, 209 Ind. 172, 199
N. E. 372, 97 A. L. R. 1474, 101 A. L. R.
1359, appeal dismissed in 298 U. S. 640,
80 L. Ed. 13 72, 56 S. Ct. 750.
The differences for purposes of classification need not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
be great or conspicuous, State Tax Commissioners v.
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 51 S. Ct.
540, 73 A. L. R. 1464, 75 A. L. R. 1536, and the
classification need not be related to the purposes for
which the tax proceeds are to be spent. Ibid. Legislative classifications are presumed valid and the legislature is presumed to have acted in accordance with
sound public policy. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83, 84 L. Ed. 590, 60S. Ct. 406, 125 A. L. R. 1383.
The litigant attacking such a classification has the
burden of overturning these presumptions. Ibid.
The split-tax is probably justifiable under the
theory that people are more likely to believe they are
purchasing something equivalen to or as nourishing
as butter because of the color of the oleomargarine, so
that the competitive effect of colored oleomargarine is
more damaging than that of the uncolored product.
McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S.
Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 ( 1904), lends this theory some
support as it held that there is such a distinction between natural butter and oleomargarine which is artificial! y colored so as to cause it to look like butter that
the taxing of the latter and not the former cannot be
avoided as an arbitrary exertion of the taxing power
without any basis of classification.
In the early days of state and federal legislation
the position was often taken, not without some merit,
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that oleomargarine was not a wholesome food. However, in recent years the advocates of restrictive legislation have dropped this argument to a great extent, and
the courts now take judicial notice of the fact that
oleomargarine is or has become a healthy and wholesome product. 33 Va. L. Rev. 631-41 (At 633). Today, it is believed that the main purpose of such laws
is the reconciling of conflicting interests, and that the
legislature in passing such laws is merely weighing various public interests and deciding to what extent they
shall receive legal protection, as well as to keep the
business free from fraudulent practices and unsanitary
conditions. Ibid.
The dairy producers probably pay as much taxes
per pound of butter as is directed against oleomargarine, due to their heavy property tax burden, so that
the high excise tax levied on the sale of oleomargarine
well may be in part a method of equalizing the tax
burden of competitive businesses. We cannot afford
suddenly to drop the protection from an industry. If
all taxes and hampering restrictions were removed,
there would undoubtedly be a rapid increase in the
production of oleomargarine and the resulting collapse
of butter prices with devastating effects on the dairy
industry, especially the small producer. The dairy industry is carried on by many small producers, while
there are relatively few oleomargarine manufacturers
and their operations are sizeable. Fortune, Nov. 1944,

P. 193.
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"The public would feel these effects not
only in adiminishing supply of butter but of
the enormous quantity of food, milk, cheese and
ice cream which are needed to sustain their high
level of nutrition. Without our highly developed dairy industry, we would have been seriously handicapped in times of national emergency. The small farm is the backbone of
American agriculture, even of the whole American way of life. There are too many values involved to sacrifice if there is any escape. Whatever may be the sins of the dairy lobby, they do
not justify the destruction or crippling of the
industry * * *." Rocky Mountain L.
Rev. 18:79-96. Fe. 146.
It is important at this juncture to note that,

"* * *

the growth of the industry
(oleomargarine) has not been checked and it
promises to grow even more rapidly * * * ''
and

"* * * a prosperious and extensive dairy
industry has been built up under the shelter of
what amounts to a protective tariff."
The regulatory taxation statutes and the police acts
passed in relation to oleomargarine has achieved production of a sanitary product, reduced the problem of
fraud and preserved a healthy, strong dairy industry.

Ibid.
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son for a classification made by the legislature, the
reviewing court must presume that the legislature
acted with such a reasonable basis in mind. The court
will not attribute to the lawmakers a purpose to disregard sound public policy except upon the most cogent evidence. Rowley v. P. S. C., 112 Ut. 116, 185
P. 2d 514 (1947). The motives that influence the
members of a legislative body raise questions between
them and their constituents alone. Cooley, Taxation,
4th Ed. (1924), Volume I, Section 67. The court
should hesitate to act in a manner that might destroy
the delicate balance of legislation. It is not the func ..
tion of the court to overturn an act because that court
disagrees with the reason or believes there are better
ways of achieving the legislative goal. Masich v. U.S.
Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,
191 P. 2d 612 ( 1948), even if to the judicial mind,
it seems unjust or oppressive. Cooley, Taxation 4th
Ed. (1924), Volume I, Section 67.
Oleomargarine is not a dairy product, and the
purpose of the legislature in Utah may well be to foster and encourage the dairy industry for the general
good of the public and to do so by equalizing the overall tax burdens placed upon the two industries. The
U. S. Supreme Court has recognized the social importance of the dairy industry (see Nebbia v. People
of the state of New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct.
505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469 ( 1934)) and
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that we do not operate under a complete laissez faire
system.
It is not unreasonable for a legislature to impose
a tax on the sale of oleomargarine that it does not impose on the sale of butter for those reasons. Further,
it is logical in the light of the above mentioned legislative purpose to impose a higher tax on oleomargarine
which is colored so as to more closely imitate butter
and as a result to constitute more of a threat to the
dairy industry. The courts generally refuse to pass on
the wisdom of the legislature in protecting the dairy
industry. The balancing of conflicting commercial
and industrial interests for the ultimate public good
is exclusively a legislative task under the principle of
separation of powers.
V. FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW
UNIFORMLY SUPPORTS THE POSITION
TAKEN BY THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION, AS SET FORTH IN THIS
BRIEF.
At the present time 1m1tation butter is taxed
and/ or regulated in 14 states and by the Federal Government. (Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah and Vermont.)
Eight of the states impose a poundage tax, such as that
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orado, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Wisconsin and Utah.) Three of those
states, including Utah, impose a split-tax (Idaho,
North Dakota and Utah); that is, uncolored oleomargarine is taxed at a lower rate than oleomargarine
which is colored to resemble butter. Four of them completely exempt oleomargarine composed of certain sub ..
stances produced domestically. (Colorado, Georgia,
Minnesota and South Carolina.) All of the states have
regulatory features written into their statutes, such as
licensing and fee requirements, the use of stamps, and
penalties for violation of the Act. Some of them make
it a misdemeanor to violate the provisions of their
Oleomargarine Acts. (Georgia, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina and Wisconsin.)
The United States Supreme Court has in a number of cases determined the constitutionality of taxes
on imitation butter and has held such taxation valid,
despite the high rates, and the common inclusion of
extensive regula tory features.
In McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24
S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, ( 1904), a case that upheld
the Georgia State Law taxing the sale of colored oleomargarine at the rate of 1Oc a pound and taxing the
sale of uncolored oleomargarine at the rate of ~ cent
a pound, the Court said that the Fifth Amendment
did not prohibit the imposition of an oleomargarine
tax which would destroy a legitimate business. It
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stated that the court would refuse to look into the
motives or purpose of the legislature when it was acting under the scope of its taxing power; that the legislature must have had in mind the difference between
butter and oleomargarine as to content, spreadability,
etc. This case has been followed in later decisions,
Cliff V. United States, 195 U.S. 159, 25 S. Ct. 1, 49
L. Ed. 139 ( 1904), and is now the settled law on the
subject. Carotene Products Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 18, 65 S. Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed. 15 (1945).
In Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54
S. Ct. 399, 78 L. Ed. 1109 (1934), the court an}swered the question as to whether a tax of 15c per
pound on the sale of all oleomargarine within the state
of Washington was violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was held that the difference between
butter and oleomargarine was sufficient to warrant a
separate classification for tax purposes and that the
tax did not violate the Due Process Clause even though
its application would result in the destruction of the
oleomargarine business (Citing with approval McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L.
Ed. 78 ( 1940).
The cases that have struck down oleomargarine
statutes have generally done so because they were improper exercises of the police power. Flynn v. Horst,
(1947) 365 Pa. 20, 51 Atl. 2d 54. Utah's Act is
primarily a revenue measure, and though it has regulaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tory features, this is not improper nor is it inconsistent.
(Cooley Taxation 4th E., (1924) Volume 1, S 27.)
In Hammond Packing Co. V. Montana, 233 U.
S. 331, 34 S. Ct. 596, 58 L. Ed. 985, a Montana
poundage tax was tested by the United States Supreme
Court and attacked on the ground that the distinction
beween butter and oleomargarine is not such as to justify separate classification. The Court stated that
there was enough difference between oleomargarine
and butter to justify separate classifications, and said:

"*

*

*

. t h e mana state rna y restr1ct
ufacture of oleomargarine in a way which does
not hamper that of butter * * * it may
even forbid the manufacture of oleomargarine
altogether * * * it may express a n d
carry out its policy as well in a revenue act as
in a police law." (Citing the Mangano Co. v.
Hamilton case with approval.)
B·est Foods v. Welch, decided in a federal district
court, 1929, 34 F. 2d 682, upheld the Idaho oleomargarine statute, and in doing so stated:
"An act is not objectionable because oleomargarine is placed in a classification by itself

*

*

.
*"

"Such legislation has reduced the chances
of fraud." 53 Harvard Law Review 1281
( 1940); "Fortune", November 1944, pg. 193,
Column 2.
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The court said in sustaining the Idaho Act as a
revenue measure that:

'' * * *

a court cannot consider the
reasonableness of the amount * * * the
exercise of acknowledged power may not be
scrutinized by the court. The responsibility
rests upon the legislature and if unreasonably
exercised redress rests with the people * * *
The act is not objectionable because oleomargarine is placed in a class by itself * * * ''
The Idaho Act provided for a license fee on
wholesalers and retailers. There was no provision in
the Act for supervision or regulation of dealers. There
was a penalty provided for violations. The fees and
taxes collected went into the general fund. Appellant
attacked the act as a regulatory measure, but the District Court held it to be a revenue act.
State courts have tended, more than the United
States Supreme Court, to declare entire oleomargarine
statutes invalid as a violation of either the Federal
Constitution or the State Constitution. However, a
state statute imposing a tax on all oleomargarine was
held valid by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
Schmitt v. Nord, 27 N. W. 2d 910 (1947). The
court followed the Magnano decision refusing to look
behind the revenue designation of the law. A similar
tax was held to violate the Kentucky Constitution in
Field Packing Co. v. Glenn, 5 Fed. Supp. 4 (W. D.
Kentucky 1933, Modified 290 U. S. 177, 54 S. Ct.
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138, 78 L. Ed. 252, 1933). Here the Constitution
specifically prohibited the destruction of a legitimate
business by taxation. Of course, no showing of such
destruction is before this court. On the contrary, the
court could take notice of the continued existence of
the oleomargarine business in the State of Utah.
There are many federal and state cases dealing
with oleomargarine regulations under the police power
but which are not relevant in this case. Typical decisions illustrate that the courts have refused to pass
on the motives of the legislature, recognizing the separation of powers as essential to our system of government.
It has been determined by the highest court of
Georgia (Coy v. Linder, 183 Ga. 583, 189 S. E. 26)
and a Federal Court of Appeals in Wisconsin (State
of Wise. v. Segal Produce Co., Circuit Court, Outagamie County, Nov. 22, 1957, March 2, 1938) that
the oleomargarine laws invoked in those states were
constitutional. Nebraska's Supreme Court held that
their excise tax on the sale of oleomargarine violated
that section of the State Constitution which required
uniformity of classification in that it discriminated
against imported oleomargarine without any reasonable basis (Thorin v. Burke, 146 Neb. 94, 18 N. W.
2d 644). The Vermont Supreme Court held that its
oleomargarine fees were unconstitutional as they were
not in proportion to the cost of the regulation required
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(Flynn, et al. v. Horst, et al., ('47), 356 Pa. 696,

51 A. 2d 54). However, the Nebraska and Vermont
cases are obviously distinguishable from the case before
this court.
VI. LEGISLATIVE INTENT C A N B E
CLEARLY DISCERNED FROM THE PROV I S I 0 N S OF THE OLEOMARGARINE
ACT, AS SET FORTH IN TITLE 59, CHAPTER 18, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AND THOSE PROVISIONS CAN BE
HARMONIZED SO AS TO GIVE EACH
ONE MEANING, AND SUPPORT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT.
Section 59-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
admittedly makes no reference to oleomargarine dealers, but only requires that a license be obtained by
dealers in cigarettes and cigarette papers. There is no
provision in any section of the statute for licensing
oleomargarine dealers.
59-18-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, imposes
a tax upon the sale of tobacco and oleomargarine. 5918-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that:
"The taxes imposed by this chapter shall
be paid by affixing stamps in the manner and
at the time herein set forth unless otherwise required by regulation of the State Tax Commission.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
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Thus, the Act requires the payment of taxes through
the affixation of stamps on both products.
59-18-5(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that in the case of oleomargarine the stamps shall
be securely affixed at the time and in the manner which
the Tax Commission may by regulation require. (Emphasis suppled.) That subsection goes on to state
that:
"such stamps shall be affixed * * * within
seventy-two hours afetr any of the above commodities are received by any wholesaler, distributor or retailer within this state, provided,
however, that all such commodities must be
stamped before being sold within the state."
It is true that the section states at a later juncture that:
"It is the intent and purpose of this chapter to require all * * * distributors and
retail dealers * * * to affix the stamps
provided for in this section to the packages or
containers of products referred to in Section 5918-1 * * *."
and that as staed hereinabove 59-18-1 makes no menion of oleomargarine. However, 59-18-4 and 59-18-5
imposes a tax on the sale of oleomargarine and requires
that stamps be affixed to containers and packages of
oleomargarine. The conflicting clause can be reconciled only if it is recognized that the intent of the legislature was to refer back to 59-18-4 or, that the leg-
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islature through oversight omitted the mention of
oleomargarine in 59-18-1, or more probably that
when the legislature deleted the oleomargarine license
provision in 1947 and amended what was then 931-1, and which for purposs of this brief is known as
59-18-1, it neglected to peruse the rest of the statu tory
sections and to bring them into harmony with the
amended section. To construe this statute in any other
manner is to render it meaningless.
Further on in 59-18-5, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, it is provided that,
"The presence of any package or container
in the place of business of any person requi·red
by the provisions of this chapter to stamp the
same shall be prima facie evidence that they are
intended for sale and subject to tax under this
chapter." (Emphasis supplied.)
Since we have quoted provisions of the chapter in
question that require oleomargarine to be stamped,
this clause must of necessity also apply to oleomargarine and oleomargarine dealers.
59-18-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, empowers the State Tax Commission to provide
"the methods of affixing and cancelling stamp
that shall be employed by persons engaged in
the sale of any of the products subject to the
tax imposed by this chapter * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
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The chapter, of course, provides for a tax on the sale
of oleomargarine and the provision just quoted makes
mandatory the affixing of and cancelling stamps by
persons engaged in the sale of oleomargarine.
59-18-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, gtves
the State Auditor the authority to have stamps prepared for use on packages and containers of "any of
the products enumerated in 59-18-1, the sale of which
is subject to tax under this chapter.,, (Emphasis supplied.) This cannot reasonably be construed to deny
him authority to prepare stamps for use on oleomargarine packages but was quite evidently an oversight
due to the obvious error previously mentioned of the
legislatur' s failure to harmonize the provisions of the
statute upon amending a portion of it.
This section goes on to say that
"when any articles, the sale of which is taxable
under this chapter * * * and upon which
such taxes have been paid are sold and shipped
to a regular dealer in such articles in another
state, the seller in this state shall be entitled to
a refund * * * upon condition t h a t
* * * he shall furnish from the purchaser
a written acknowledgment that he has received
such goods and the amount of stamps thereon
* * *." (Emphasis supplied.)
''The taxes shall be refunded in the manner provided above for the redemption of unused stamps."
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We have previously established that oleomargarine is
taxed under the provision of this Act.
At another point in 59-18-10, it is provided that
"The State Tax Commission shall sell the
stamps herein provided for only to persons
holding licenses as provided in this chapter.''
This is quite evidently in conflict with the aforementioned sections of the statute and can only be reconciled
by acknowledging that the legislature in amending
59-18-1 and withdrawing the requirement of oleomargarine licenses neglected to consider the effect of
such an amendment on the other sections of the statute
and to bring them into a harmonious relationship with
other portions of the statute.
Legislative oversight is further highlighted by the
title of this Act which was ''Oleomargarine and Tobacco Licenses.'' This was not changed, even though
the provision for licensing oleomargarine dealers had
been deleted.
The Tax Commission contends that the intent
of the legislature was that the above mentioned statutory clauses should relate to oleomargarine as well
as to tobacco.
The court will give effect to all the sections of an
act, if possible. (Western Auto Transpo·rt V. Reese,
104 Ut. 393, 140 P. 2d 348 (1943).
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That interpretation which will give effect to each
statutory provision and harmonize them with each
other so that on one of them will be meaningless must
be adopted if possible, since it is not to be presumed
that the legislature would enact a meaningless statute.
(Smith v. American Packing and Provision Co., 102
Ut. 351, 130 P. 2d 951 ( 19 ____ ); each part or section
of a statute should be construed in connection with
every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. (Rowley v. P. S. C., 112 Ut. 116, 185
P. 2d 514 ( 194 7).
"Where the Legislature's intent is ascer ..
tainable from the context of a statute, not withstanding the omission of words by inadvertance or clerical error, the court will insert the
words necessary to carry out such intent, and
the act will not be declared invalid for uncertainty, where reason demands the insertion of
words therein." (Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P. 2d 937 (1940),
126 A. L. R. 1318.)
Where a literal interpretation of a statute gives an absurd result, the court may search the enactment for
further indications of legislative intent by examination of the wording of the act. (Rowley v. P. S. C.,
112 Ut. 116, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947). The construction urged by the Tax Commission would harmonize
all of thep revisions of this statute and give them effect
and significance. It would support the validity of the
statute and carry out the intent of the legislature. For
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these reasons the Tax Commission contends that the
court should accept that construction.
VII. THE RULE OF STRICT C 0 NSTRUCTION OF TAXING STATUTES IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Taxpayers, in the concluding paragraph of their
brief. allege without supporting authority that the
oleomargarine law in question should be strictly construed if not deemed unconstitutional. However, the
rule of strict construction of taxing statutes is not applicable in this case. The rule that tax statutes are to
be liberal! y construed in favor of the taxpayer is only
imposed in case there is doubt as to the intention of the
legislature or as to the authority of the Commission.
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Ut. 170, Moss
v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Ut. 2d 60. In the present case there is absolutely no doubt as to the intention
of the legislature to tax the sale of oleomargarine or as
to the authority of the Commission to enforce the
mandate of the legislature. This is in accordance with
a notable authority on taxation, e. g., Cooley, Taxation, Volume II, Section 505, Pages 1125, wherein it
is stated:
"Without regard asto whether tax statutes
should receive a strict or liberal construction, it
is elementary that they should receive a fair construction to effect the end for which they were
intended. This does not mean such a construeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

tion as to defeat the intention of the legislature.
Where there is really no ambiguity the rule that
the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer does not, of course, apply."
In addition, we point out at this juncture that
the construction given a statute by those given the
duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled
without cogent reasons. McKendrick v. State Tax
Commission, 9 Ut. 2d 418, 347 P. 2d 177 (1959).

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the oleomargarine .',~ct, as set forth in Title 59, Chapter 18, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, should be upheld as constitutional. All presumptions are in favor of its validity.
The classifications contained therein are reasonable in
the light of its purposes. It does not violate the requirements of due process of law, either procedurally
or substantively. Its contents are germane to one another and to its title, and its provisions, when considered together, can be reasonably construed so as to
effectuate the intention of the legislature.
~

Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,

NORMAN S. JOHNSON,
Asst. Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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